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PREFACE

In the academic year 1952-53 a group of scholars at the Hoover Library strove to learn something about the social structure of modern military institutions by applying the technique of elite analysis to the leadership of a number of armies. Few institutions of comparable influence have been as little studied by social scientists as have armed forces. The present volume is a report on a particularly little known group of armies, those of the satellites. It is an analysis of biographical data on their general officers.

A year ago the manuscript of this monograph was sent away. Now reading proof, I realize with some pain how swift-moving is the revolution of our times. It poses to this author an immediate dilemma: to correct statements about it which are now out of date and gain the advantages of hindsight, or to leave some embarrassing evidences of his fallibility, reporting only what the research showed at the time it was done. In general I have followed the latter policy. Since I cannot now undertake a new analysis of the 1955 generals of the satellite armies, it seems better not to doctor the conclusions which flowed from the analysis of the 1951-52 generals so as to make the findings conform better to what has actually happened since. Except in the chapter on China, no changes in the text have been made since its completion shortly after the fall of Beria. In the Chinese chapter we have simply cut some illustrative material which derived much of its interest from the fact that it gave current information on who held what posts. With a major reorganization of the Chinese government in the fall of 1954, that became passé. The conclusions, however, have been left in full view.

When the manuscript was written, Malenkov was the ruler of Russia and the "new course" in the satellites was just getting under way. However, the data had been analyzed and the conclusions drawn well before then. Our conclusion was that a vigorous militarization was going on in the satellites. During the new course, with its emphasis on coexistence and consumers' goods, one could have doubted this conclusion. The fall of Malenkov, and with it the restoration of an emphasis in the satellites on military production and military preparation, has justified the thesis (p. 27) that the new course was a temporary deviation, the thesis which led us to stick to the conclusions deriving from our 1951-52 data.

As I look over the monograph, what I might change now are not so much specific statements as emphases. We mention the gradual softening of the pattern of purges, yet perhaps in our prognoses the pattern of 1938 still weighs a little too heavily. A number of generals who had been purged when we wrote have reappeared in minor or symbolic posts, notably General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps future purges will be more gradual and less conspicuous than now, though they will not cease. Army officers in particular may be tac-

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Subject of the Paper

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This is a study of leadership in Communist armies. More precisely it is a study of the conflict between two needs which the Communists face if they are to build up satellite armies: the need for loyal military leaders and the need for skilled ones. Every army, indeed every institution, has this dilemma. It needs leaders who believe in its cause, but it also needs leaders who are proficient. Even a free and stable society has some difficulty locating men who are both adequately loyal and adequately competent. For a dogmatic and revolutionary society the problem is more difficult.

A free society asks only basic loyalty not doctrinaire fanaticism, and basic loyalty it generally commands from those who grow up in it. A free and stable society can therefore pick the most capable men and take it for granted that they will ordinarily do what is demanded of them.

On the other hand, a society which demands that its leaders adhere to every detail of a dogmatic line cannot take loyalty for granted. A society with a fanatical creed must favor leaders who are orthodox over those who are able. If the fanatical society is a revolutionary one it must also favor untutored rebels over experienced leaders.

The Communist movement is both doctrinaire and revolutionary. It is a dogma in arms. Because it uses arms it has a desperate need for skilled military leadership. But because it is revolutionary and fanatical it often beheads its most skillful leaders.

That is a dilemma for the new Communist armies; it is the classic dilemma of revolutions. How the satellites attempt to resolve it and secure for themselves an adequate military leadership is the subject of this paper.

B The Satellite Armed Forces and Their Generals

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Until 1945 the Soviet Union, with such minor appendages as Outer Mongolia, was the world's sole Communist power. The Red Army was therefore the only Communist state army illustrating this dilemma between loyalty and professional skill. But the problem was not a new one to the Communists for they had come upon it in their considerable tradition of revolutionary militarism.

From the time of Engels, himself a military specialist, Communist political thinking has focused heavily on problems of utilization of armed forces. Revolutionary armies were built illegally and in turn collapsed as Communist bids for power failed. Even in countries where no Communist army had ever existed, Communists paid considerable attention to military affairs and trained their followers in the use of arms. The Twenty-One Points laid down at the Second

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Bodnaras, Farkas, Berling, or Cepicka such as they have for Vorishilov or Budenny. The Politburocrats undoubtedly regard the former, as they do all foreign Communists and indeed all Communists outside their own clique, with a large measure of contempt. So the Soviet bosses have kept the Communist generals from putting their hands to really important military professional matters and have freely purged them.

The most important differences between the Russian and satellite army leadership patterns arise from the fact that the satellites are satellites. Except perhaps in China, the armed forces which have been permitted to develop, are strictly subordinated to Russian control and to Russian needs, techniques, and personnel. In countries with long traditions of antagonism to Russia, as most of the satellite countries are, this creates an obvious source of tension and vulnerability within the satellite armed forces.

While this basic source of vulnerability is so obvious as to need no further comment here, it would be a mistake to consider the satellite armed forces as undifferentiated masses of discontented persons ready to seize the first opportunity for liberation. Such feelings certainly exist but it is a problem for research to determine some of the factors relevant to their intensity, distribution, and change-over time. Satellite armies are complicated combinations of fanatical Communists, would-be Titoists, would-be defectors waiting for a chance to escape, politically inert persons, and miscellaneous other elements.

D. The Uses of Military Elite Studies

• 121 One reason for studying how the Communists imposed their control upon the satellite armies, the kinds of satellite officers upon whom the Soviets rely, and the tensions among them, is that these facts have some bearing on the willingness and capability of the satellite forces to fight. We have no illusions that our data will foretell the conduct of the satellite forces in any given operational situation. We hope, however, that they may bring light to bear on a few of the relevant factors.

The importance of leadership in an army need not be stressed. We have chosen to study general officers because of their determining role in the making of key decisions or in a failure to make them. Mass demoralization in the ranks may destroy the fighting effectiveness of an army, but mass demoralization may itself be a symptom of leadership failings. The collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Army, for example, was not so much a failure of morale in the ranks as it was a failure of morale at the highest level. Corruption and defeatism were particularly prevalent at the command level. The political warfare that was most devastating to Chinese Army morale was that which bribed and disoriented its leading cadres. Students of sykewar have sometimes overlooked the implications of such facts. Despite

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the importance of leadership, students of psychological warfare in the recent past have tended to neglect the possibility of achieving results through communication to the opposing elite.[3a]

Elite communications are important even when the aim is mass demoralization; they are more important when elite actions are sought. Rebellion against the powers that be or resistance to their demands has far more often been sparked by dissident elite elements than by mass sufferings. In the last war, for example, the most dramatic resistance to Hitler—the July 20 movement—came from the higher ranks of the army and from aristocratic and elite elements of society. It was to them rather than to the masses of the German people that appeals of a political character were and could have been effectively addressed.

The elite are not unreachable. The elite have access to a breadth of information which is denied to men in the ranks. They have access to superior channels of information and have greater freedom of movement and contact.

While the elite are particularly important and also particularly accessible to sykewar, problems of reaching them have been studied less by scholars than problems of reaching armies as wholes. The way of life and attitudes of contemporary military leaders have been but little described in writing. A vast lore exists on the classical military man, but the modern military man is a new type. The complexity of modern warfare has made partly irrelevant what historians and biographers of the past have said about the conduct and feelings of military commanders. The modern general officer is a technician and specialist as well as a fighter and leader of men. The old image of the courageous and dramatic leader with a band of personally devoted followers is by no means out of date but it is now only part of a much more complex picture of what a commander must be. We have yet to delineate a full image of the motivations, loyalties, and attitudes of the general who must also concern himself with the complexities of modern science, technology logistics, record keeping, recruitment, propaganda, and finance.[3b]

No academic scholar regardless of his professional competence can hope to draw this image satisfactorily by himself. The scholar, ordinarily a man with a nonmilitary background and lacking a lifetime of training in military doctrine and military practice, can hope at best either to add a few insights arising from his specialized techniques or to systematize the far deeper perceptions which military specialists themselves are bound to have. It will only be when the present generation of military men from all countries has enriched the available body of firsthand material through memoirs, essays, and histories that the social scientist will be able to turn to this literature and add to it the understanding that arises from general theories of human behavior. We do not pretend for a moment in the present study to offer anything like a definitive interpretation of the

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mores and manners of any current military elites. We can provide only a few glimmering insights. The man of lifelong military experience may deepen these if he finds in here data whose significance his individual experience will enable him better to understand.

We cite as one example of the type of fact arising from our research the striking and significant finding that the satellite armies as distinct from Communist revolutionary armies, tend to select top leaders not for qualities of personal courage and personal leadership but for bureaucratic management skills.

This specific example of a change in the breed of men chosen for leadership after Communist regimes are stabilized illustrates the broader question of the relationship between elite structure and social behavior. Our present study is predicated upon the assumption that a man's way of life determines to a considerable extent the sort of person he will be and the types of things he will do. This is not a new notion. In 1889 Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, proclaimed that:

> "War is, from first to last, an affair of the soul; the predominant partner in the business is the mind or spirit . . . Examine your thoughts, your whole stock of ideas, and see where they come from. You will find that, for the most part, you caught them, like so many colds, from the people about you. Thoughts are the common property of a number of people living together, the connecting link between the members of a community. . . A child born into an English family learns as he grows the English words, in using which he begins to think the thoughts of his nation. As he grows up he imbibes the ideas of his class, or his trade, profession, of his political party, and of his church or sect. Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts."[4]

Such extreme determinism is not implied by this study. We do not question for a minute that individuality and special circumstances interplay with these more stable background factors. The morale of a soldier varies with his immediate circumstances in regard to food, promotions, advance or retreat, mail service, etc., as well as his social background. Sykewar field operations require attention to such current facts around which discontent is expressed. But the more stable factors influence how a person will ultimately respond to situational variations.

The relationship between the situational and stable factors is a complicated one. Perhaps three points can be made. (1) Certain stable factors determine who will be vulnerable to which situational deprivations or inducements. (2) Certain stable factors determine the available communication nets through which situational discontents may be expressed or fail of expression. (3) Certain stable

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sources of discontent determine whether or not a given situation will be seized upon to rationalize that discontent.

(1) Many examples can be cited of differential vulnerability of different social strata to the same situations. Shils and Janowitz point out that among German deserters in World War II there was a very large participation of Volksdeutsche not to mention Austrians, Poles, and Russians.[5] Despite the fact that the Volksdeutsche had been among the most chauvinist elements in the period of Nazi successes, the fact that they were not easily assimilated into closely-knit primary groups in the German Army made them especially susceptible to surrender propaganda.

For different reasons German chaplains seemed to be particularly susceptible to the propaganda of the Russian-controlled Free Germany Committee. They were most vulnerable to humanitarian and semi-pacifist appeals for ending the war quickly—a further example of a predisposition to vulnerability arising from life history.

The Czechoslovak Army, due to the many vicissitudes it suffered, is a particularly good example of an army in which different social segments responded differently to different pressures because of different life experiences. It was originally formed in 1919 of a combination of ex-Austro-Hungarian officers, ex-officers of the Czech legion in Russia in World War I, and some former officers of Czech legions in France and Italy. During the twenties and thirties top positions in the army were shared by the legionnaires and the one-time Czech career officers of the Austrian Army. During the first decade the latter was the dominant group in the highest positions. These former Austrian officers had received good military education and experience during their lifetime service in the Austrian Army and they proved very useful to the young Czechoslovak Army. They were distinguished from the legionnaires in several respects. They were older. The greater part of them were born in Bohemia (near Germany) not in Moravia nor Slovakia. They came from a somewhat higher social stratum than did the legionnaires. They had started their careers in the army and had never experienced other occupations. Their military training was exclusively Austrian and they came from the most urbanized and industrialized portions of the country.

Around 1930 most of the ex-Austrian officers had been retired. By this time the younger legionnaires, most of whom had been recruited from Russian prisoner of war camps during World War I, had received enough theoretical military education and had advanced sufficiently in rank to take over the positions of the "Austrians." The great majority of the legionnaires had started their lives in non-military occupations before World War I. They came largely from Moravia. The reason for this was purely accidental although its ultimate consequence was significant. During World War I the Moravian recruits were sent to the Eastern Front whereas regiments recruited in Bohemia served on the Italian Front. When the Bolsheviks

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took power and quit the war, the organized Czech units who had been caught in Russia had to fight their way out, engaging in a long, bitter, and heroic struggle with the Bolsheviks all the way from the Eastern Front across Siberia to Vladivostok. In the course of this struggle they acquired experience and an esprit de corps which made them by the 1930's the leading elements of the new Czechoslovak Army. It therefore happened that the newer group of officers came largely from Moravia, a less industrialized and more Slavic portion of the country, and that their fathers were predominantly members of low and middle-income farm and white collar groups.

The majority of the legionnaire officers received their theoretical military education at the Czech War College established in 1919 by the French Military Mission and a considerable number had gone to the École de Guerre in Paris. This added to their common heritage of pro-Western experience. After the German occupation it was among the Slovaks who had not played a major role in the army previously that the strongest collaborationist force was built. There was apparently only one Slovak general officer in 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, but others were promoted to general rank during the German occupation.

We could continue this story tracing what happened to the Czechoslovak Army-in-exile. The Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in France during the first months after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia found a considerable number of Slovaks who had been residents of France for many years. The refugees and these together made up the first Czechoslovak division in France. The Slovaks had been confused by the political events in Slovakia and as a result their attachment to the Czechoslovak cause was weak. In the chaos of the French defeat many of them considered the war lost and refused to leave France. About half the division was evacuated to Great Britain but this was a distinctly self-selected group. The number of officers was far out of proportion to the number of men and some hundreds of officers had to accept demotion to the ranks. A full 48 percent of the men who arrived in England were members of the intelligentsia and a large percentage were Jews. Many of the officers were young and inexperienced and some were anti-Semitic. Most of the difficulties and schisms were given a political veneer. Among a great portion of the soldiers there were strong socialist leanings and communist leanings besides nationalist ones. All this made the troops fertile soil for every possible kind of propaganda: defeatist, pro-German, pro-Hungarian, etc. The Communists in view of the Soviet-German treaty were agitating for desertion from the army. A number of them led by Dr. Vlado Clementis (recently executed in Prague) left the army for the duration of the Soviet-German pact, most of them to rejoin when the Soviet Union was attacked.

In this unusually complex history of an army sharply riven by national, political and career differences, we see in some detail how vulnerability to special situations may differ depending upon

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long-term identifications with various segments of the social structure.

(2) Not only does susceptibility to situational pressures vary with the social structure but so does the opportunity for communicating whatever discontent may arise. Whether an unfavorable event will have an adverse effect on morale obviously depends on the communication net which either promotes or restricts knowledge of it. In Germany toward the end of World War I, for example, the two key factors in the decline of morale were the food situation and the Social Democratic movement. The food situation affected many strata of the population and was the source of the most important discontent. It might, however, have had little effect on the German war effort if it had not been for the existence of a highly organized and powerful labor movement, which was semi-pacifist in its orientation. The main agitation of the Social Democrats was not around the food situation but rather around the desirability of negotiating for peace. This very abstract and ideological agitation became effective because of the coexistence of popular discontent arising from hunger, and at the same time the hunger became effective because an organized group provided a communication net for expression of anti-war feelings. Thus the organized proletariat was the source of Germany's greatest vulnerability. Although that class was not necessarily the most discontented group, it was the group whose discontents had an effective channel of expression.

(3) Situational discontents are also related to long-run social tensions in that they provide the rationalizations in terms of which continued hostilities are expressed. In China, for example, the main complaint against the Nationalist armies was that they were corrupt, demoralized, and irresponsible. The charges of corruption were no doubt borne out by facts. At the same time there is good reason to feel that corruption was not the real reason why much of the Chinese population turned against the Nationalist military leadership. The allegation of corruption was rather a rationalization of conflicts between major social segments in China. An earlier study in this series, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites by Robert C. North, showed that the top leadership of the Nationalists was predominantly an urban merchant group, while the top leadership of the Communists was predominantly rural (both landlord and peasant) and intellectual.

According to Chinese traditions, nepotism, protection of one's family fortunes against the interests of the state, and what we would consider graft were parts of the mores of the business groups which provided much of the Nationalist leadership. Corruption did not carry the same connotations as in the West On the other hand, China as a whole is a peasant country and one in which top prestige goes not to business men but to scholars. Persons of rural origin and professional groups were not satisfied with the leadership provided by the western-oriented Nationalist trading elements. It was this conflict

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of social strata, of basic ideology, and of national perspective which was expressed in the revulsion against the graft and corruption of the business-oriented Nationalist leadership. The Nationalist failure was a failure to broaden its base of leadership rather than simply a failure of administration. The former, however, was seldom discussed in day-to-day politics. The latter was on everybody's lips.

Political intelligence requires awareness of both the immediate issues around which conflicts come to take place and of the social structure in which these conflicts develop. The former can only be studied quickly from day to day as the conflicts develop. Long-range planning must focus on some of the basic sources of vulnerability which can be kept in mind as specific situations emerge. This study is not designed to spot the particular sources of tension and conflict which may arise at any given time point in the future. It is designed to identify the elements in the lives and careers of satellite officers which may differentiate the reactions of one group from those of another, or which may lead them to view one another with either trust or distrust, or which may lead them to view broad world questions either with knowledge and perspective or provincially, or which may lead them to have either purely hostile or just mixed feelings about the Soviet regime.

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E. The Evolution and Future of the New Communist Armies

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In the United States the most popular lay theory about the satellite armies (as about the satellites themselves) is that they are temporary jerry-built structures riven by inner tension and designed only as a makeshift until such time as the Russians are ready to incorporate them within the Russian Army itself. Our research leads to a different conclusion, namely that the Soviet plan has been to build up the satellite armies for a long stint. We cannot exclude the possibility that some day in the future it may become Russian policy to eliminate the satellites as separate nations. It may even be that such a long-range plan rests today somewhere in the files of the Kremlin. While that is a possibility, it seems improbable from the evidence now available to us. Our findings indicate rather a Soviet plan to develop the satellite forces into important, strong, but separate offensive forces completely subordinate to and allied with, but not part of the Russian Army.

1. The Period of Coalition, 1945-48:

It was not until 1947 that this plan began to be implemented by the Soviets. Until that time their great problem in all the European satellites was to consolidate Communist power.

In each of the European satellites a coalition government was formed immediately after the war including both Communists and non-Communists. The Benes government-in-exile returned from

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen-

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erals but also lower ranking officers and also the relationships between the ranks. However, published biographies—our primary source—do not exist for lower ranking officers and do not tell us anyanything directly about relationships. This study attempts to do only that which can be done with an analysis of the top levels of the military elite viewed, of course, in the context of background information. It is not a complete study of military leadership in the satellites.

In order to trace the trends in the satellite regimes we stratified the sample of generals by time period. We collected biographical data not only about the postwar generals, but also for a sample of generals of the pre-Communist regimes. We broke the samples of satellite generals into groups according to the date at which their careers terminated. Thus for Romania we have a sample of pre-1940 generals, a sample of generals active on the axis side between 1940 and 1944, a sample of generals who maintained their careers during the early postwar years, 1944-47, and finally a sample of those generals who have continued to operate since 1948.

Data on contemporary history such as the data of this study quickly grows out of date. The research for this study was done during the academic year 1952-53. While every attempt was made to get up-to-date materials, it was inevitable that the satellite sources which were read and analyzed were published for the most part in 1951 and 1952. They too had a time lag between the facts to which they referred and the date at which they were printed. Roughly speaking, we can say that the picture presented in this study is the picture as of the year 1951.

The sources for a study of satellite armies are so thin at best that no consistent effort has been made to limit the moment for which we are presenting a snapshot. Wherever material is available we have used it. Where later information has come in, even up to the moment of the final revision of this text, we have tried to take account of it, although no systematic effort has been made to bring the study up to the minute. What we here present is a picture of Soviet plans and procedures as of two years ago with some corrections suggested by more recent events.

The most important event in the Soviet world during these past two years was of course the death of Stalin and the installation of the Malenkov regime with its slightly modified tactical line. Stalin died on March 5, 1953 by which time almost all the research for the study had been completed.

In the half year since then the new Soviet dictators have found it necessary to make concessions to the people at least while they are consolidating their rule. In Russia the emphasis has been on consumers' goods. In the satellites where riots in Berlin and strikes in Czechoslovakia have shown how intense is the prevailing discontent, the new line has also been to make concessions to the desires of the populace. Without any real evidence we may hazard the hunch

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that one unpublicized aspect of this new line may be a slowing down of the program of military preparation in the satellites and a re-evaluation of their military potential. Both the open outbreak of satellite discontent and the Politburo's desire to stress temporary economic concessions might lead to such changes in military policy.

For all these reasons we may guess that the picture to be drawn in this study, based as it is upon 1951 data, represents the Soviet plans for the satellite armies at the end of the Stalin era, but not in all respects the way in which things are actually working out at the present moment. We do not know how present actualities diverge from the plans nor what recent changes have been made in the plans. However great these divergences and changes may be, it still remains useful to see how the Politburo conceived the prospects of satellite military development just before the traumatic event of Stalin's death. Whatever corrections future developments will force us to make in our prognoses, one useful piece of data will be the intentions with which the Russians started. It is to ascertain these that our data is relevant.

G. The Method

The methods used in this study are more fully described in the general introduction to the Hoover Institute Elite Series, The Comparative Study of Elites, An Introduction and Bibliography, by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. We record for each individual in our sample certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of his birth, date of death, cause of death, jobs held, place of origin, occupation of father, schools attended, associations joined, foreign travel, awards and decorations, publications, etc. A list of fifty characteristics for which we look when they are available is presented on pages 26-27 of the above mentioned volume. For general officers, among the most important special characteristics on which we sought data were their military training, their nonmilitary education, their branch of service, their combat record, the extent to which they held nonmilitary jobs, the extent to which they participated in politics, their record of promotions, etc.

The data on any individual is recorded on a punch card and tabulations are then made of the incidence of the coded characteristics in different armies or different parts of the same army.

H. The Problem of Sources

It is difficult to obtain biographical information on officers, particularly on those from totalitarian countries. We started this project with an experimental attitude and with the hope, but no conviction, that the desired information might be obtained. On the whole

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127 we are more than satisfied with this aspect of our endeavor. The most fruitful single source consisted of Who's Who's and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries, and articles about prominent figures which appear from time to time even in totalitarian countries. We also relied to some extent on informants who had had firsthand contact with the armies in question. They were often able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in brief printed sources.

Unfortunately the sources are not consistent in their accuracy or criteria of reporting. For one country we may have very adequate information on education but not on parental occupation. For another country it may be the other way around. There is also the possibility and indeed likelihood of falsification in some of the biographical reports. The Communists often present fanciful biographies. They tend, for example, to play up or invent humble backgrounds. They also tend to emphasize the native satellite origins and experiences of officers whose real life histories may involve prolonged residence in Russia while refugee sources emphasize the foreign origins of Communist officials. Thus two quite different biographies of Marshal Rokossovski have been published.

Having expressed these warnings about the reliability of some of the sources, it would be a mistake to regard them as invalidating the data. While the data undoubtedly contain a wider margin of errors than is customary in domestic social science studies, they are far more precise and reliable than mere subjective untested impressions. Our goal was to get better information than heretofore available, not to get perfect information. What we report here is the result of as careful a process of checking and evaluation as we were able to make. We feel that there are some trends which it reveals of which there need be little doubt even though individual errors have crept into the data.

1. Introduction to the Case Studies

121 In this introductory chapter we have talked of the European satellites as if they were more or less the same. In the subsequent chapters we shall examine them one by one. In so doing we shall note differences in the problems faced and solutions taken, differences which we have so far neglected. We have been able to discuss the East European satellites as a unit since they follow a common set of Russian-originated patterns. We have examined above the sequence of parallel policy changes from one of coalition to one of consolidation to one of training and development which seem to indicate a common set of Soviet directives. We have also noted the adherence to Russian practices in equipment, uniforms, training, and regulations.

The end result was an organizational structure for the satellite

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armies conforming fairly closely to that in Russia. The normal pattern at the time of Stalin's death was to have a Minister of Defense who was one of the top Communist bosses and under him three deputy ministers, one of them in charge of the land army, one of them Chief of Staff, and one of them head of the political department. At general headquarters below these men were a series of inspectors in charge of different arms and services. These and the commanders of the three or four military districts into which the country is divided constituted the top of the military elite.

But in the Soviet world no plan however permanent it is proclaimed to be, is more than a temporary pattern valid until a new line is adopted. Under the Malenkov regime some significant changes have been taking place in military and governmental structures in Russia which have been or will be imitated in the satellites. It would be a mistake to base long-run predictions upon the temporary expedients adopted by Malenkov in the period of consolidation of his power. It is our assumption that a far better clue to long-run Soviet policies and programs is to be found in the plans underway at the time of Stalin's death. Recent deviations from these are more likely to be temporary adjustments than permanent changes in line.

Both the temporary adjustments and the permanent changes are ordered from Moscow and copied in the satellites with a greater or lesser time lag. Each Russian twist or turn is mirrored throughout the Soviet world. An order from Moscow whether it be to give certain key jobs to the best of the newly trained officers, or whatever else it may be, could start a process of purging (with greater or lesser violence) which would sweep in disciplined fashion from one satellite to another. We are about to describe how the basic Soviet military pattern was followed with appropriate variations in each of the satellites from the end of the war to the end of the Stalinist era.